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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 10-2236 
_______________ 
 
DEREK WALKER,  
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CLEARFIELD COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY; 
THOMAS P. MCGINNIS 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-09-cv-00073) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 10, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 24, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Plaintiff-appellant Walker appeals the District Court’s decision dismissing his 
retaliatory prosecution action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failure to state a 
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claim.  Specifically, Walker alleged in his amended complaint that the Clearfield County 
District Attorney, William A. Shaw, Jr., violated his (Walker’s) First Amendment rights 
by prosecuting him based on false evidence in retaliation for his decision to seek political 
office.  We affirm the District Court, though on a different basis than it used.1
The allegations in Walker’s amended complaint are as follows.  On August 25, 
2007, he was involved in a “domestic incident” with his former girlfriend, Katie Ferry.  
Walker alleges that this incident involved no violence, and that the police officers who 
responded to Ms. Ferry’s call informed him not to have any further communication with 
her, but did not arrest him.  Shortly thereafter, Walker announced his intention to seek the 
Republican nomination for a seat in the United States House of Representatives, and 
began campaigning.  Before the primary election was to take place (but several months 
after the domestic incident), Shaw began to investigate the incident, allegedly coercing 
false witness statements against Walker.  Following this investigation—and just a few 
days before the primary election—Shaw directed the Chief of Police to file charges 
against Walker, who then lost the primary. 
  See Erie 
Telecomms. v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 1998) (“An appellate court may 
affirm a correct decision by a lower court on grounds different from those used by the 
lower court in reaching its decision.”). 
In a nutshell, Walker alleges that Shaw intentionally manufactured false witness 
testimony against him, and then used that testimony as the basis on which to file criminal 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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charges.  Walker further alleges that Shaw did all this in order to make his candidacy for 
political office untenable—or, in other words, to retaliate against Walker for his choice to 
seek office.  He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, and a declaration that Shaw 
infringed his First Amendment rights.   
The District Court dismissed Walker’s first amended complaint for failure to state 
a claim.  The Court first concluded that absolute prosecutorial immunity protected Shaw 
from liability for money damages.  Then, as to Walker’s demand for declaratory relief, 
the Court held that the claim failed on the merits because “[i]nsufficient support among 
voters in [Walker’s] district provides no grounds for equitable redress in this court.”  
Opinion at 2.   
Treating all of Walker’s allegations as true, we conclude that Shaw was not 
entitled to absolute immunity as to at least part of Walker’s claim.  The crux of Walker’s 
complaint is that Shaw manufactured evidence against him in order to establish probable 
cause to arrest Walker.  The Supreme Court has held that when prosecutors perform 
investigatory functions, like determining whether there is probable cause to arrest a 
suspect, they are entitled only to qualified, and not absolute, immunity.  Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1993) (“A prosecutor may not shield his 
investigative work with the aegis of absolute immunity merely because, after a suspect is 
eventually arrested, indicted, and tried, that work may be retrospectively described as 
‘preparation’ for a possible trial”).  Thus, to the extent that Walker’s complaint concerns 
Shaw’s pre-indictment investigation of the allegations against Walker, Shaw is entitled 
only to qualified immunity.  By contrast, Shaw is entitled to absolute immunity from 
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monetary—but not equitable—liability based on the decision to prosecute.  Supreme 
Court of VA v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736-37 (1980) 
(equitable relief available even if defendant has prosecutorial immunity).  Here, Walker 
seeks declaratory, as well as monetary, relief.  Accordingly, we shall turn to whether 
Walker’s complaint states a claim on which relief could be granted. 
Walker argues that “he had a First Amendment right to participate in the political 
process free of a politically motivated criminal prosecution based on false evidence.”  
Appellant Br. at 10.  To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim predicated on 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) constitutionally 
protected conduct; (2) that the defendant took adverse action sufficient to deter a person 
of ordinary firmness from exercising his rights; and (3) a causal connection between the 
two.  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003).  There is also a fourth element 
required to state a First Amendment retaliation claim premised on an investigation that 
leads to a decision to prosecute:  the absence of probable cause for the prosecution.  
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265-66 (2006); Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 154 
(3d Cir. 2010) (probable cause element applies even where same individual acted as both 
investigator and prosecutor).   
While Walker’s complaint may have been sufficient as to the first three elements, 
it fails on the final prong.  In the underlying criminal case, Walker pled guilty, though to 
a lesser offense.  Borrowing from the closely analogous malicious prosecution context, 
we conclude that a guilty plea—even one for a lesser offense—does not permit a later 
assertion of no probable cause.  Cf. Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002) 
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(malicious prosecution claims require that underlying criminal proceedings were 
terminated in manner signifying the innocence of the accused).   
This conclusion is consistent with Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), under 
which Walker’s claim would fail even if he could allege the absence of probable cause 
despite his guilty plea.  In Heck, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 relief is not 
available a to civil plaintiff for whom success on the merits would “necessarily imply the 
invalidity of [the] conviction,” unless the conviction was previously negated.  Id. at 487.  
Here, the basis of Walker’s suit is that Shaw manufactured evidence against him, and 
that, as a result, Walker pled guilty to a crime.  If that allegation were proven, it would 
plainly imply the invalidity of Walker’s conviction, and thus Walker’s § 1983 suit runs 
afoul of Heck.   
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court. 
 
 
